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A B S T R A C T
Participatory irrigation management (PIM) has been broadly promoted by public administrators and donor
organizations. The reasons for this push include performance failures of state-controlled irrigation schemes and
the need to improve irrigation productivity for meeting rising food demands. A popular reform for increasing
participation and ownership is represented by Irrigation Management Transfers (IMTs). IMTs mean replacing the
government with the civil society (farmers) in irrigation management, and they go beyond working with the
public sector as in PIM. These widely implemented reforms produced mixed experiences. Besides, the evaluation
of IMT cases is reliant on scarce quantitative data. IMTs are also difficult to replicate due to methodological
issues. However, qualitative research can engage with stakeholders’ perceptions and narratives, especially the
most relevant target group, namely farmers. We provide in this study stakeholders’ opinions and attitudes to-
wards several waves of IMT reforms in the Gezira scheme in Sudan. This mega-scheme is of high developmental
and socio-cultural importance for the country ever since the independence from the British Empire. Using a
perception survey and in-depth interviews with key informants, we illustrate the failure legacies to reform the
Gezira scheme by enhancing farmers’ participation through Water User Associations (WUAs). While both
farmers and experts have suggested a poor implementation, inadequate farmers’ involvement and unclear ob-
jectives of the reforms, the reforms’ recurrent failures are explained within complex historic and political con-
texts. There are long-standing legacies of development missteps of the Gezira scheme, with no clear and ultimate
triggers of performance deterioration. Besides, splits in professional cultures, power imbalances, political in-
strumentalization (of farmers) and the lack of farmers’ awareness or capacities are salient factors for under-
standing the poor state of the Gezira scheme. It is difficult for stand-alone irrigation management reforms to be
successful. Such reforms need to be embedded within a comprehensive policy package that prioritizes irrigation
governance and proposes sound regulations based on clear roles, consensus-making and prior consultation.
1. Introduction
Irrigation is seen as a solution to meet rising food demands across
the world. About 20 % of cultivated land under irrigation produce 40 %
of the global food output (UNESCO, 2009). With irrigation, crop yields
per hectare and profitability are estimated to be higher than in rain-fed
agriculture (Darré et al., 2019; Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Lobell
et al., 2009; Vico and Porporato, 2011). Irrigation is found to contribute
to poverty alleviation, as it makes food more available and affordable
for the poor, due to higher productivity and lower risk of crop failure
(Hussain and Hanjra, 2004). The development of irrigation schemes
was greatly expanded after the Second World War as governmental and
international (donor) investments peaked in the 1970s. According to
Seibert et al. (2013), on a global level, more than 300 million hectares
are today equipped for irrigation (69 % in Asia, 17 % in America, 8% in
Europe, 4 % in Africa, 2 % in Oceania), with the majority (62 %) irri-
gated with surface water. By consuming a 70 % share of all freshwater
withdrawn globally and up to 95 % in developing countries, agriculture
is the largest water use sector Seibert et al. (2013). Almost half of ir-
rigated agriculture is practiced in only three countries, China, India and
Pakistan (FAO, 2011). Other areas of high irrigation density can be
found in the US and along the Nile River in Egypt and Sudan.
While food demand will increase by 50 % globally by 2050 (and 100
% in developing countries), today’s agricultural demand for water re-
sources is largely unsustainable due to the depletion of aquifers, re-
duction of river flows, degradation of ecosystems and the salinization of
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irrigated soil (WWAP, 2015). In order to secure a world free from
hunger and malnutrition, agriculture needs to become more sustainable
and resources use more efficient. Unwanted side effects of irrigation,
such as environmental damage and soil erosion need to be minimized.
At the same time, extensive investment in irrigation infrastructure, as
seen around the world in the second half of the 20th century, has
proved to be insufficient. In fact, governments and international donors
realized that there are serious management problems that inhibit the
realization of irrigation schemes’ full potential. In response, manage-
ment reforms were promoted in the guise of Irrigation Management
Transfers (IMTs). IMT implies transferring the irrigation responsibility
and authority from the public hands into civil societal actors, such as
the Water User Associations (WUAs), or into private sector entities
(Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Senanayake et al., 2015). If irrigation
management reforms involve merely working with (and not replacing)
the government, the term Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) is
used (Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999). This irrigation subsector reform
(IMT) was heralded (e.g. by donors) as a recipe to reduce or even
eliminate government expenditure for the operation and maintenance
of irrigation infrastructure, improve scheme efficiency and productivity
as well as increase the income of farmers (Cambaza et al., 2020; Playán
et al., 2018). In the second half of the 20th century, it has been pro-
moted in tens of countries, but with mixed results (Garces-Restrepo
et al., 2007).
Given the urgency to improve irrigated agriculture, understanding if
and how IMT can live up to the expectations is highly important.
Irrigation management is a key factor for water use efficiency and
agricultural productivity alongside other factors such as infrastructure,
operation and maintenance (O&M), land and water resources or crop-
ping practices (WWAP, 2015). There have been numerous case studies
that evaluated the impact of IMTs on irrigation and water use perfor-
mance. These studies include relatively successful IMT cases from India
(Mishra et al., 2011), Mexico (Rap and Wester, 2013) and Korea (Choi
et al., 2016). Other cases reported IMT failures on substantial issues
such as irrigation scheme performance, maintenance of infrastructure,
institutional set-up of WUAs or the collection of fees. While the reasons
and reform missteps vary across case study, IMT difficulties are re-
ported from across the developing world, e.g. in Pakistan (Bell et al.,
2013; Wegerich and Hussain, 2016), Central Asia (Yakubov, 2012),
India (Bassi and Kumar, 2011), Indonesia (Suhardiman, 2013), or
Ghana (Kakuta, 2019).
The impact direction of IMTs has also not been consistent. For ex-
ample, in Turkey, irrigation associations improved collection of fees but
not water use efficiency (Kibaroglu, 2020). In Central Asian countries
such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, IMT implementation was not
consequent in the different periods after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, while the involvement of state remained high (Zinzani, 2016,
2015). In fact, fifty years after IMT became a global trend, evidence-
based research and the literature on post-reform scheme performance
are largely quantitative using performance key indicators (KPIs), and
less through qualitative analysis via farmers’ perceptions. This poses
several methodological difficulties to isolate and measure the impact of
IMT on scheme performance, and shortcomings regarding the re-
presentativeness of the analyses (Senanayake et al., 2015). There is
little focus on farmers’ opinions and the perception of involved stake-
holders, which can vary greatly from one case to another (Senanayake
et al., 2015). In fact, farmers, as the irrigation water users, are at the
center of any IMT process, especially when responsibility is handed
over to WUAs. Thus, it is important to understand their perceptions,
motivation, capacity and needs. Furthermore, the motivation behind
IMTs is not studied thoroughly, since the reduction of government ex-
penditures is often cited as the main objective for introducing such
reforms (Merrey et al., 2007; Vermillion, 1997). The relevance of
studying stakeholders' perception of IMT is arguably high due to their
key role in IMT implementation, or more specifically the role of farmers
in WUAs.
The Gezira Scheme received a lot of attention from researchers and
international organizations. There are several studies on the develop-
ment of the scheme and possible reasons for its poor performance (Al
Zayed et al., 2016, 2015; Elshaikh et al., 2018; Plusquellec, 1990;
Salman, 2010; Wallach, 1988; World Bank, 2000). Yet, these studies
have not yet gauged farmers’ and stakeholders’ opinions and attitudes
towards several waves of IMT and institutional reforms. The objective
of this study is to make a contribution to the wider discussion con-
cerning if and how irrigation management transfer can lead to better
irrigation management, and ultimately greater food security, environ-
mental sustainability and poverty reduction. This paper represents a
reform outlook study that stresses the importance of soft issues such as
addressing developmental legacies, involvement of farmers, the man-
agement of reform expectations, awareness raising or good irrigation
governance. More specifically, it looks at the perceptions of farmer
groups and on-site stakeholders of IMT with the aim of exploring their
understanding and lived experiences of the management reforms. The
paper also contextualizes irrigation management reforms of the Gezira
scheme within historic eras of state involvement in irrigation man-
agement in Sudan and within international experiences of IMT. As such,
the study does not evaluate the success of the reforms. The failure of the
reforms is widely accepted as evident in the pullback of reforms
package. Besides, the paper does not evaluate Gezira’s scheme perfor-
mance and the impact of IMT as it is quite difficult to satisfactorily link
IMT reforms to the performance deterioration of the scheme, although
such detailed efforts exist (e.g. Elshaikh et al., 2018).
2. Case study: Gezira irrigation scheme
2.1. Gezira’s key characteristics and reform timeline
With a net command area of approximately 2.1 million feddan,
which corresponds to 882.000 ha, the Gezira Scheme is one of the
world’s largest, probably the largest, irrigation scheme under one
management. It is located on the Blue Nile, where the Nile water is
stored by the Sennar Dam and supplied to the field through an extensive
network of canals, consisting of two main canals (194 km), major canals
(2300 km), minor canals (8000 km) that feed tertiary canals (locally
called Abu XX) and then field ditches (Abu VI). The plain fields are
evenly and slightly sloped towards the northeast and allow for gravity
irrigation. Fig. 1 provides the key characteristics of the scheme.
The scheme was inaugurated with the construction of the Sennar
Dam by the British in 1925. The initial objective was cotton production
for Britain’s textile industry. The scheme reached today’s size with the
Managil Extension through the construction of the Roseiries Dam in the
early 1960s. Beyond the canalization network, the scheme’s infra-
structure includes machinery, equipment, staff housing, roads and ve-
hicles. The value of the infrastructure is roughly estimated to amount to
eight billion USD and is an important asset of the government, while
around 12,000 farming families and thousands of state administrators
usually live there (Eldaw, 2004). During the first years after in-
dependence in 1956, cotton remained the main crop for export and
sorghum the second as a stable food crop for the tenants. In the mid-
1970s, agriculture was intensified and diversified by adding ground-
nuts, vegetables and wheat. Impressive numbers materialized, such as
the Gezira scheme representing less than 11 % of Sudan’s cultivated
area, yet producing 60 % of cotton, 75 % of wheat, 35 % of groundnuts
(Verhoeven, 2015). Nation-wide, large-scale irrigation was promoted
and peaked at the end of the 1970s. The price for the expansion of the
area under irrigation was a reduction in agricultural efficiency. In the
Gezira scheme, the intensification and expansion have produced an
impressive output in the short-term, but it contributed to the dete-
rioration of the system in the long-term. This trend was reflected in the
titles of early publications about the scheme. Arthur Gaitskell’s book
from 1959 was called “Gezira: A Story of Development in Sudan”. Not
even twenty years later Anthony Barrett (1977) published “The Gezira
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Scheme: An Illusion of Development”.
2.2. Overview of management change and reforms
The Gezira scheme has a unique land tenure arrangement. After the
establishment of the scheme, the government either bought land or
forced private owners to lease the land to the government for 40 years.
The basically dispossessed landowners became tenants. Land allotments
were limited to the size of 15–30 feddan (feddan equals around 0.4 ha).
After the expiration of the 1927 Land Ordinance, no new system was
arranged, which still causes problems today. Ever since, the manage-
ment of the Gezira Scheme has been highly centralized in the hands of
the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB). The SGB determined the crop rotation
plan, including fallow period and was responsible for land management
(including levelling necessary to allow gravity flow, which has been
neglected since 1970s due to lack of resources), and water management
Fig. 1. Location map of the Gezira Scheme in Sudan. Source: Government Statistics.
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from minor to field canal. The upper system was managed by the
Ministry of Water and Irrigation. Administratively, the scheme was
divided into 18 groups, composed of five to seven blocks (114 in total)
headed by a block inspector. The blocks were divided into a unit called
number/nimra (90 feddan) which consisted of up to 18 Hawashas
(farm/tenant plot) (Hussein et al., 2002). In modern-day Sudan, the
Gezira scheme witnessed different phases of relative prosperity (after
independence till the 1970s), decline due to intensification, increased
water use and silt accumulation after the construction of the Mangail
extension in 1966 (since the late 1970s), liberalization (during the
1990s), and institutional reforms (since early 2000s). Fig. 1 provides a
short historic trajectory. The economic liberalization of the 1990s did
not lead to the desired effect of increasing agricultural productivity
based on a new incentive structure for farmers. The government
Fig. 2. Performance categories and indicators for the Gezira Scheme. Sources: 1,2,3 from (Al Zayed et al., 2015); 4 from (Bushara and Barakat, 2010).
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disengaged from the scheme, but the private sector did not fill the gaps.
The scheme continued to deteriorate at an alarming rate. In order to
illustrate the major performance problems of the Gezira scheme, we
summarize in the infographics in Fig. 2 key performance categories of
the scheme and introduce selected performance indicators using data
from secondary literature.
According to a 2000 World Bank report, the Gezira scheme had
become the “least efficient schemes in world” and needed to be in-
stitutionally reorganized (Salman, 2010). Mostly based on the World
Bank’s recommendation, the Gezira Scheme Act was issued in 2005 and
more than 1500 WUAs (one for each minor canal) were established in
2007. This act represented the IMT in the Gezira scheme. According to
this act, farm irrigation and management including collection of fees
and weed cleaning were now the responsibilities of the WUAs. Through
the control of the minor canals and field canals, the reform transferred
the responsibility of field irrigation from the government to the farmers.
In the Gezira scheme, irrigation water reaches the field via the main
canal, major canals, minor canals and eventually the field canals
through gated field outlets pipes (FOPs). The field canals (Abu XX) ir-
rigate 90 feddan through 9 small field ditches (Abu VI), which means
that that one Abu VI irrigates 10 feddan. Before 2005, block inspectors
from the SGB were responsible for the minor canals and engineers from
the Ministry of Water for the outlets from the major canals. The 2005
Gezira Act replaced the 1984 Act (adopted after the last great re-
habilitation project in 1983) and the 1927 Gezira Land Ordinance,
which had forced private landowners to lease their land to the gov-
ernment. However, already in 2009, the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry admitted in a report that these reforms has been “a total
failure” since the disposition of scheme’s assets, the crop choice
freedom and the establishment of WUAs lacking needed capacities have
resulted in “irrecoverable damage” to the scheme (Salman, 2010).
Table 1 provides a mapping of stakeholders as well as their roles and
interests before and after the Gezira Act.
In the years after the 2005 reforms, the performance of the Gezira
scheme did not pick up, which led to the 2014 Gezira Act Amendment.
This amendment replaced the WUAs with agricultural cooperatives
(Farmer Unions), while the scheme’s maintenance and management of
the irrigation (including water allocation) was transferred to the
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. The government was to finance
the scheme through water charges and to appoint a scheme’s Governor
by the Republic’s President (instead of the elected General Manager of
the scheme). Here, the Ministry of Water Resources was not mentioned
in the reform since, in 2011, Irrigation was moved to the Ministry of
Agriculture (from the Ministry of Water), while Electricity was given to
the Ministry of Water Resources (and Electricity) in the same year. In
2015, water management was given back to the now-called Ministry of
Water Resources, Irrigation and Electricity, transferred from the now
called the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The reforms of 2014
met a strong opposition from farmers since it increased the role of the
Governor and pushed farmers into producers’ associations. According to
a University of Khartoum Professor, this decision was made because
“the government is betting on the weakness of the financial, adminis-
trative and logistical capabilities of the associations – and their failure
in the end, to be given to the affiliates of the National Congress Party”
(cited in Radio Dabanga, 2015a). In September 2015, the Farmer Un-
ions (known as WUAs prior to the 2014 reforms) were dissolved
through the Constitutional Decree 32, which effectively meant a soli-
dification of responsibilities for water management of the scheme under
the Ministry of Water Resources, Irrigation and Energy while decision-
making systems and the organizational structure of the scheme become
unresolved (Hydraulic Research Center, 2016).
3. Method and data
In order to gauge the perception of the stakeholders’ on the different
episodes of the IMT reforms in the Gezira scheme, this study largely
relies on qualitative data using key informants’ interviews, a farmers’
survey and a mapping of stakeholders and their declared attitudes. Ten
expert interviews (semi-structured) were conducted with the leadership
and a staff from the Gezira Board (2), the Ministry of Water Resources
Irrigation and Electricity (1), the Hydraulics Research Center (4), the
Agricultural Research Center (1) and independent experts (2). These are
mostly stakeholders located in the Gezira scheme area, and work almost
exclusively on this scheme. These experts have been identified during a
first visit to the study area in December 2015. The final number and
selection of experts was a result of their availability and willingness to
contribute to this study during a second field visit in March 2016.
Interview protocols served as documentation. The experts did not
Table 1
Overview of stakeholders, roles before and after 2005 Gezira Act, interests and position.
Stakeholders (names as of
2010)
Role before 2005 Role after 2005 Interests & Position on Gezira Act 2005
Ministry of Irrigation and
Water Resources
(MIWR)
historically responsible for (overseeing)
irrigation management, provision of water,
operation of the Sennar Dam
no role under new the Act with the transfer of
responsibility to an irrigation unit within Gezira
scheme
interest mainly in maintaining role, status,
jobs; largely opposed to reforms; non-
cooperative in implementation
Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry (MAF)
Minister of Agriculture chaired the Board of
Directors of the Gezira Scheme (the Board)
absence of a specific role in the new Act;
represented in the Board as “relevant ministry”
initially no opposition to the act, but
concerns about rushed WUA introduction;
later very critical of implementation
Ministry of Finance and
National Economy
(MFNE)
owner of assets, source of financial support owner of assets; to provide funding for maintenance
in return for water charges; approval of budget;
represented as “relevant ministry”
no opposition to the Act; opinion that SGB
should be a financially independent entity
and costs to be covered by government of
Gezira State
Sudan Gezira Board (SGB) running the scheme; authority and finances
decreased with the decline in cotton production
and introduction of individual accounting
systems; 10,000 staff (mid-1980s)
converted into an agricultural research institution;
continues to play a major role through Board of
Directors of the scheme; full-time chairman
appointed by the President, 85 contracted
employees (2010)
unclear; tremendous loss of staff and
authority, but little evidence on reform
opposition
Gezira Farmers Union
(GFU)
executive committee involved in managerial,
financial and technical matters
at least 40 % (6 out of 14) of the Board member are
representatives of the GFU
influential active supporter of the
institutional reforms; spearheading
development of the 2005 Act
Landowners and Tenants compulsory lease of land to the government
since 1927; no new deal after expiration of the
lease contract in 1967; no collection of rent due
to loss of value
the Act meant a repeal and replacement of Gezira
Land Ordinance 1927
demanding back rent or compensation;
solution pending
World Bank – – supporter of the Act; facilitator and funder
of missions and workshops
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necessarily represent the organizations they are working for, but rather
their personal perception. Further, since the paper is primarily con-
cerned with farmers’ involvement and their perception of the irrigation
management reform, a structured survey with multiple-choice and
open-ended questions was conducted in 2016. The survey aimed at
gathering information on farmers’ experience and perception of
changes in operational, maintenance, economic and managerial per-
formance of the scheme before and after 2005. Particularly, the survey
assesses qualitative variables such as farmers’ knowledge and level of
trust regarding the initiated reforms. The survey borrows from IWMI
methodology to assess IMTs (Samad and Vermillion, 1999). Out of the
total 50 interviewed farmers, 15 were interviewed over phone in order
in to get voices from other areas of the vast Gezira scheme and not only
from around Wad Medani. Farmers were sampled based on re-
commendations from local research institutions on representative
farmers’ villages to visit based on prior research experiences. Several
small groups of farmers were instructed about the survey and asked to
fill in the survey individually. They were supervised by a helper from a
research institution in Wad Madni, Sudan, who addressed farmers’
questions. The translated survey can be found in Annex 1.
4. Results
4.1. Stakeholders’ perception on Gezira’s past performance and reforms
4.1.1. Technical issues and ultimate triggers of performance deterioration
There seems to be a consensus in the perception of key informants
that the performance of the Gezira scheme has deteriorated, although
identifying the start and the reasons of this process is not simple. In fact,
such a deterioration might have occurred in three to four waves. First,
in the mid-1970s, the scheme witnessed a period of “unattended irri-
gation” when farmers started to do what they wanted, young people
moved away, elderly tenants were not able to run the farm alone, and
sharecroppers were hired to do the farming. It was the end of family-
based agriculture since “share-croppers had no connection to the land,
came from rain-fed agriculture, did not know the Gezira system, and
worked only in the morning to open the FOP [Field Outlet Pipe] and let
it run” (expert interview 2, March 2016). With increased crop diversity,
the balance of the gravity flow system in Gezira was disturbed (expert
interview 6, March 2015). Further, since the 1970s, irrigation started
during rainy season, which led to cost explosion and a drastic increase
of sediments (times four) (expert interview 4, March 2016). However, it
is difficult to exactly determine the deterioration time point and rea-
sons, since there is limited to no time series data for performance in-
dicators. However, a common perception of deterioration since late 60 s
or and 70 s is strongly held among experts. Second, with the switch
from the Joint to the Individual Account System in 1981 (i.e. instead of
flat taxes compensating the government for water and land services, a
tenant needs to pay incurred input costs from his individual account),
problems of inadequate maintenance and deficient cost recovery started
(expert interview 9, March 2016). However, other interviewed experts
did not share this view.
Third, after 1992, private banks got involved in agricultural finance
in the scheme (replacing the Bank of Sudan’s interest-rate free loans),
and some experts see this as a negative moment due to expensive loans,
deterioration of services and a delay of the irrigation season (expert
interviews 3 & 4, March 2016). Finally, while there is some evidence
that the Gezira scheme started to deteriorate prior to the 2005 Gezira
Act, this Act did not stop this process (Elshaikh et al., 2018). Moreover,
some experts indicated several problems resulting from the Act which
was intended to reduce governmental expenditures. There are many
problems mentioned by the interviewed stakeholders (expert interviews
1, 3, 5, 9, March 2016). Stakeholders mention that there has been an
infrastructure damage due to a lack of know-how of the WUAs (e.g.
over-digging leading to the destruction of the gravity system of the
scheme, failure to collect fees, no cleaning of weed or inadequate water
use for different crop types). Furthermore, there was a deterioration of
infrastructure inspection and maintenance after the government sold
vehicles to employees who were not willing to use them anymore.
Considering these technical problems, some interviewed experts argued
that these issues would have been solvable if the wider political and
economic contexts were suitable, and they pointed out to larger issues
such as the withdrawal of government funding or demographic
changes, e.g. young people moving to the cities and ending farming as a
family business. It has also been difficult to attract foreign investors
(e.g. from China or the Gulf States) to the Gezira scheme due to its
complicated reality with many powerful farmers and vague institu-
tional and management set-ups as well as unclear land use rights (ex-
pert interview 9, March 2016).
4.1.2. Wider issues and splits in professional cultures
Another contextual issue more specific to the management of the
Gezira scheme is that of the professional and cultural split between
(water) “engineers” and “agriculturalists”, which has become evident in
the wake of the exchange of irrigation responsibilities between minis-
tries. When the responsibility for irrigation was moved from the
Ministry of Water to the Ministry of Agriculture, irrigation engineers,
preferably with experience in the Gezira scheme, were needed at the
latter ministry to continue their job of maintaining the outlets from the
major canals. However, “engineers refused to move to the Ministry of
Agriculture. It was a question of dignity. The minister of agriculture
discussed face-to-face with the 30 top engineers, but all refused, he
found some people among the more junior engineers” (expert interview
9, March 2016). This was confirmed by other experts saying that those
engineers refused to work with the Gezira Board. It was not about
salary, but about social status. According to them, when you are spe-
cialized in irrigation, you cannot work for agriculturalists. Therefore,
the Gezira Board did not have an adequate number of engineers. “This
effected the output of the whole things and resulted in a low pro-
ductivity” (expert interview 4, March 2016). Many of the interviewed
engineers regarded negatively the transfer of the irrigation tasks to the
Ministry of Agriculture in the wake of the Gezira Act, and subsequent
reforms – this decision was reversed only in 2015. Their perception is
that Gezira’s problems are not merely institutional but rather an in-
stitutional-technical challenge. In fact, the Water Ministry has been
alienated by the original 2005 reforms, and even further by the 2010
decree transferring all irrigation responsibilities to the SGB.
4.1.3. Farmers’ power
The Gezira reform empowering WUAs was a “long, slow and con-
troversial” process, with the irrigation management transfer to farmers
barely taking place because of the lack of funding for canal re-
habilitation that was a pre-requisite for handover (Salman, 2010). In-
deed, the farmers themselves were a powerful group, but had little trust
in public institutions and the SGB. In fact, prior to the 2005 reforms,
farmers have been criticizing the SGB for being overstaffed, inefficient
or incompetent while they demanded WUAs to be in charge (expert
interview 10, March 2016). Particularly in 2003, mistrust grew as rain-
fed mechanized farmers endured a crop loss due to a shortage in rainfall
in the northern parts. Some farmers perceived the government’s with-
drawal from the scheme as a sort of escape from due compensation for
rain-fed based farmers who were then asked “to work like other
farmers”, but looking back “it was a trap” (expert interview 2, March
2016).
While farmer unions were supporting the 2005 reforms, some ex-
perts questioned the representativeness of these unions. There are about
140.000 farmers in the Gezira Scheme with different backgrounds,
while the unions have been criticized for being pro-government, not
inclusive or seeking more influence in the scheme. In fact, in March
2015, the relationship between the government and the unions reached
a low point, as some news outlets reported the farmer unions of the
Gezira Scheme to have planned an election boycott in coordination
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with opposition forces. Accordingly, the unions were using visits to
villages, speeches in public markets, cars fitted with loudspeakers and
tours to remote areas to advocate for an election boycott (Sudan
Tribune, 2015). Six months later, in September 2015, the unions were
dissolved which provoked an outcry and was considered as “an attempt
to break-up the unity of farmers” (Radio Dabanga, 2015b) and a pre-
diction that Gezira farmers “will now be replaced by figures loyal to the
ruling National Congress Party” (Radio Dabanga, 2015a). These de-
velopments might have had wider implications. Gezira farmers are re-
sidents of the “Hamdi Triangle” – whose support is/was considered
vital for the regime. This is interesting to consider in the wake of the
2019 revolution. At the level of the Gezira scheme, it can be said that
the negative relations and the lack of cooperation among stakeholders
have impeded reforms from addressing any managerial and technical
problems.
4.2. Farmer’s perception
4.2.1. Survey results
The perception survey gauged the views of selected farmers on the
performance of the irrigation scheme after the 2005 reforms, the ob-
jectives of these reforms as well as their general perception of the post-
reform period. On the scheme’s performance (Tables 2 and 3), the re-
sponses indicate that there is generally a perceived deterioration of the
scheme after the 2005 reforms. At the same time, the overall dete-
rioration tendency is not significant with some issues (e.g. conflicts
among farmers) indicated to be slightly less. Further, the level of par-
ticipation of farmers is perceived to not have changed significantly
because of the reforms. Here, the reforms brought crop choice and ir-
rigation freedom for the farmers, which might have reduced the oc-
currence of conflicts on the operational level without changing the
perception of the farmers regarding the participation requirement in
the management of the scheme. One needs to note that, when dis-
aggregating the responses based on the educational background, the
deterioration of the operational performance (adequacy and timing of
water delivery and fairness of water distribution) is overwhelmingly
perceived by less educated farmers. However, due to the small sample
size, it is not possible to judge that this trend will hold for the whole
scheme. Some interviewed experts mentioned that better educated and
wealthier farmers could have benefited more from the reforms. They
explained that more affluent farmers could afford pumps and equip-
ment to exploit the freedoms associated with the reforms. As mentioned
earlier, the transfer of irrigation responsibility was limited in scale since
it was not much practiced. Here, richer farmers were more able to or-
ganize, update their systems and thus manage irrigation tasks them-
selves. Other farmers did not participate because the required re-
habilitation could not be undertaken. Furthermore, farmers perceive
the costs to have remained the same or increased slightly and this can
be explained by the ineffectiveness of the WUAs with regard to fees
collection. With regard to the farmers’ post-reform perception of the
reforms’ objectives, personal impacts and the management of the
scheme, results from relevant survey questions are in Table 4.
4.2.2. Discussion of survey insights
First, it seems rather contradictory that most farmers saw their
personal situation become better despite the perceived deterioration of
the schemes’ performance. In the same line, the farmers reported that
the costs became either higher or the same, but apparently did not af-
fect their personal situation. This contradiction can be explained by the
ineffectiveness of the fees collection system of the scheme or by the
existence of multiple factors that can affect the farmers’ income.
Second, on the reforms’ objectives, it is surprising that a significant
number of farmers thought that the reform objective was to destroy
them, although this answer was not given as an option. This might be
explained by the timing of the survey, which took place after the
farmers’ unions were dissolved. Third, farmers did not indicate any
predominant factors for the performance deterioration of the scheme.
They seem to regard the bad shape of the scheme as a result of legacies
of bad management, missing economization, the deterioration of in-
frastructure and missing finances. In this overall context, single issues
such as training and the choice of technology are not seen the most
relevant problems. The WUAs did not contribute to improving the de-
velopment perspective of the scheme since they failed to offer an al-
ternative institutional set-up for the scheme’s management or to con-
tribute to its long-term financial sustainability through higher
collection rates of water fees
Finally, the results indicate that the reforms’ objectives were not
clearly transmitted to the farmers. On the responsibility for irrigation
management in the scheme, nobody mentioned the Ministry of
Agriculture, although this was given as an option. This ministry over-
took the irrigation resort in 2011, and the scheme’s irrigation respon-
sibility in 2014, but lost both responsibilities to the Water Ministry in
2015. The farmers’ response indicate that they do not favour the idea of
the irrigation being under the Ministry of Agriculture. At the same time,
they see this responsibility to be under the SGB or the Water Ministry.
Here, it is quite interesting that the farmers do not see this responsi-
bility to be primarily theirs (as the 2005 Act envisioned), while the
opinion of a small minority reflect the status-quo, i.e. irrigation as a
shared responsibility between SGB and the Water Ministry. The
farmers’ were also asked about their overarching attitudes on whether
they regard the reform as a mistake, welcome the idea of WUAs and
require more trainings, technical support or funds. Opinions were
Table 2
Perception of water management practices after and before the 2005 reforms (Gezira Act).
Better with WUAs Worse with WUAs About the same Don’t know
Adequacy of water supply 42 % 48 % 8 % 2 %
Fairness of water distribution 40 % 52 % 4 % 4 %
Timing of water delivery 38 % 44 % 16 % 2 %
More conflicts with WUAs Less conflicts with WUAs About the same Don’t know
Occurrence of farmers’ conflicts 34 % 44 % 14 % 8 %
Conditions/ functionality of canals 40 % 42 % 12 % 6 %
lower costs with WUAs Higher costs with WUAs About the same Don’t know
Water costs (fees) 14 % 32 % 50 % 4 %
Table 3
Perception on participation extent before and after the reforms.
Before 2005 After 2005
Low 40 % Low 44 %
Moderate 24 % Moderate 22 %
High 36 % High 32 %
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consistently spilt on all of these propositions, which might indicate that
participatory irrigation or irrigation responsibility transfer is not a
unique or predominant concern of farmers.
5. Reform outlook and directions
5.1. Impediments and reform derails
The IMT experience in Sudan can be characterized as a recent ex-
periment that needs to be understood by considering some unique
features and conditions of the scheme. In this section, we introduce
some of the specific conditions that might have led to reform derails
and failures. We also discuss some alternatives and solutions and refer
to IMT experiences elsewhere. First, the scope and timing of the IMT
reforms in the Gezira scheme indicate that reforms might have been
sudden and little prepared. Many of the stakeholders regard the reforms
as a (late) trial to save an already deteriorating scheme. Furthermore,
the reforms represented a sweeping change without adequately piloting
ideas such as WUAs or other forms of farmers’ participation. Another
important point is that, in the Gezira case, the size of this scheme is
quite large and therefore the farmers’ financial and governance cap-
abilities differ widely. Similar to other experiences from developing
countries, the objectives and expectations from the Gezira IMT reforms
might have been overambitious. Therefore, the post-reform period has
witnessed setbacks and many reversal, leading to halting the reforms
and dissolving any farmers’ participation altogether. In this context, a
gradual reform pathway can allow for experimentation of approaches
and appropriate participation designs in large schemes. IMTs reforms
are one alternative, which, if designed right, can help bring out benefits
for irrigation governance, and as a result, better irrigation performance.
While there are other alternatives such as management contracts or
water markets (Zekri and Easter, 2007), such alternatives need to be
tested and deliberated in terms of advantages and disadvantages. At the
same time, common property based solutions can be made refitted and
better, e.g. through material incentives for farmers to allow participa-
tion, increasing empowerment of farmers or strengthening social re-
lationships (Ostrom, 2015). Such incentives were largely absent in the
IMT reforms in the Gezira scheme.
Second, one can postulate a lack of a conducive environment for the
IMT reforms. This is mainly due to the political and developmental
context of the scheme. The scheme has witnessed decades of negli-
gence, poor management and performance deteriorations. While IMTs
can result in larger irrigated areas, increased crop yields and increased
farm income in other cases (Chaudhry, 2018; Choi et al., 2016; Garces-
Restrepo et al., 2007), such general conclusions on performance have
not been confirmed in the Gezira case study (Elshaikh et al., 2018). In
the Gezira scheme, the challenges might have been unique, and it is
difficult to transmit some failure factors to the Gezira Act failure. For
example, the reliance on donors or the lack of power delegation to
WUAs (e.g. heavy state involvement or unwillingness to delegate
power) can hinder the success of reforms (Bassi and Kumar, 2011;
Cambaza et al., 2020; Yakubov, 2012; Zinzani, 2015). On the one hand,
variables such as reform opposition by some actors or donor-led re-
forms can be confirmed for the Gezira scheme. However, neither reform
opposition nor the overreliance on donors have been explicitly given as
overriding reasons for failure, and especially not for the initial period of
the reforms. Further, (national) state interferences were arguably low
since many interviewees perceive the reform as a way to abandon the
scheme due to its financial costs. In fact, the common reasons in the
responses of our interviewees relate mostly to the lack of capacities of
farmers as well as the difficult developmental legacies of Gezira
scheme, i.e. a highly politicized and complex mega-scheme under a
longstanding deterioration trend undergoing selective and half-hearted
reforms.
Third, IMT reforms have led to institutional fuzziness and in-
securities. Using qualitative data from interviews with farmers and key
experts, we showed that the IMT in the Gezira scheme has been poorly
implemented while it was perceived rather negatively. This is true even
for farmers who were the target group, which the irrigation transfer was
supposed to be benefit. In addition, there have been a lack of clarity
about roles and responsibilities of the WUAs iand conflicts among
ministries or even professional groups (engineers vs. agriculturalists).
These factors led to power struggles that de facto hindered the im-
plementation of the reforms. Besides, the awareness among farmers on
the objectives and merits of the IMT reforms can be seen as low. This is
similar to the study by Bell et al. (2013) who concluded for Pakistan
that the perception of stakeholders on their roles in the IMT reforms
differed from the designed organizational structure. In fact, incon-
sequent and adverse reform experiences are commonplace in water
management, while consensus building and peace-making among in-
stitutions can help mitigate opposition and reform failure (Al-Saidi,
2017). At the same time, the system of free crop choice and irrigation
transfer requires discipline and coordination. Both are difficult without
improving the capacities of farmers to administer such responsibilities
while addressing infrastructure deterioration first. Here, it is important
to explore ways that can empower farmers and ease opposition and
interferences. For example, states can accompany IMT reforms with
bureaucratic reforms (Suhardiman, 2013), or empower coordinating
Table 4
Farmers’ perception of the reforms and the post-reform period.
Who should be responsible for irrigation management in the Gezira Scheme? What was the objective of the Gezira Act 2005?
Gezira Board 38 % Increasing participation of farmers 8 %
Ministry of Water 26 % Decreasing participation of farmers 4 %
Farmers 10 % Improving Operation & Maintenance 8 %
Ministry of Water and Farmers 10 % Improving agricultural productivity 24 %
Ministry of Water & SGB 2 % Reducing government expenditure 20 %
SGB and farmers 2 % Increasing government expenditure 0%
altogether 6 % Don‘t know 12 %
don’t know 6 % Other: “destroying the scheme” or “destroy us” 24 %
What has been the biggest problem in the past 10 years? (number of farmers while multiple answers chosen by some
farmers)
Did your situation change with the 2005 Gezira Act?
Inadequate water supply 12 My situation improved 50 %
Lack of training 1 My situation become worse 36 %
Lack of funds for operation and maintenance 12 The scheme improved but not my farm 2 %
Lack of technology 2 Nothing changed, it was just politics 6 %
Lack of marketing 20 Don’t know 6 %
Poor management 18
Others (1 farmer said that the biggest problem is that farmers have freedom to choose crop) 1
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public water authorities to make IMT work through technological in-
terventions and a network of support (Rap and Wester, 2013). Another
study suggest that farmers’ empowerment can take place within irri-
gation bureaucracies through elections, larger representation and
creating responsive institutions (Wegerich and Hussain, 2016).
5.2. Contextualization and overall challenges
Sudan or the Gezira Scheme is a quiet recent example of IMTs re-
forms that have been implemented across the world since the 1960s.
Although it is still difficult to evaluate the implementation and out-
comes of IMTs due to the lack of consistent frameworks (Khadra et al.,
2018, 2017), IMT case studies have produced a range of factors influ-
encing the success of these reforms. Thus, IMTs have resulted in mixed
experiences and a long list of success and failure factors (Cambaza
et al., 2020; Playán et al., 2018). In this section, we highlight the im-
portance of embedding IMT reforms in more comprehensive frame-
works in order to increase success. First, IMT reforms need to be seen as
a part of larger efforts of investments in irrigation management. The
reform experience of the Gezira scheme highlights the importance of
the wider context of scheme management and irrigation governance. In
fact, the lack of consistent empirical evidence for the supposed superior
performance of WUAs is partly due to methodological issues (i.e.
methods and data used for linking performance changes to institutional
reforms) (Senanayake et al., 2015). However, IMTs might be more
successful if embedded within a larger effort of sound irrigation gov-
ernance and regulation. The developmental legacies of the Gezira
scheme show that this scheme has been trapped in a low-performance
state in which yield is low, farmers lack markets and growth opportu-
nities and the scheme’s financial sustainability is threatened. Fig. 3 il-
lustrate this trap of a low scheme performance leading to livelihood,
financial and infrastructure deteriorations which, in turn, reinforce bad
performance. Here, IMT reforms need to be seen as a part of a larger
package of governance remedies to address the low performance ma-
laise in irrigation schemes. Often, stakeholders and farmers mention
how the lack of modernization (investments, technology transfer and
maintenance) has hindered any performance improvement in the
scheme. In fact, alongside farmers’ perception, the state of the infra-
structure has been confirmed as an important factor for IMT reforms in
other cases (Bell et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2016; Garces-Restrepo et al.,
2007; Playán et al., 2018). Here, good governance and adequate reg-
ulations can break the low performance trap of irrigation schemes.
Major reviews of IMT experiences often state factors for hindering IMT
success such as the lack of legal institutionalization of farmers’ parti-
cipation, clear water rights, supporting infrastructure, markets, in-
centives and adequate accountability measures, coordination mechan-
isms, or transparency (Cambaza et al., 2020; Merrey et al., 2007; Playán
et al., 2018). However, such issues go beyond IMT reform actions, and
relate the way we allocate resources and develop the irrigation sector. A
key aspect for successful IMT reforms is related to the government’s
capacity to support farmers, delegate power, set-up institutional fra-
mework and prevent the creation of a vacuum regarding maintenance
of roads or major canals (K’akumu et al., 2016; Kakuta, 2019). In the
Gezira scheme, alongside the development of markets, infrastructure
and investments, prioritizing irrigation management through a parti-
cipatory, transparent and equitable governance (some features of a
good irrigation governance) is highly demanded by farmers and sta-
keholders.
Second, the participation and the formation of irrigators (organi-
zational set-up for farmers’ participation) need to be designed carefully
and to consider soft issues such as trust and ownership of the reforms.
The idea to get farmers involved in management was in response to the
realization that the huge infrastructure investments done in the 1950s
and 1960s did not pay off (Meinzen-Dick, 2014). Further reasons for the
promotion of IMT included the need to reduce governmental ex-
penditure and several assumptions about the superior economic
performance by farmers. Accordingly, WUAs have more commitment,
ownership, accountability and ability to achieve a better productivity,
cost-efficient operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure
(Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Samad and Vermillion, 1999; Senanayake
et al., 2015). However, these assumptions need to be tested on a case-
study basis and they need to consider the organization of farmers’
communities in the irrigation scheme. In the Gezira scheme, farmers
seem to not appreciate the motivation of the reforms in terms of re-
ducing the public financial burden. Instead, the reforms have been
partly perceived as an act to abandon the scheme and to punish
farmers. Such a mistrust is highly relevant as it undermines the reform
ownership. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the capacities of
the farmers to organize and execute the operations of the WUAs were
available prior to the reform act. The farmers were given little support
during and after the reform. Until the reform was abandoned almost ten
years after its initiation, trust and support of the reform were de-
creasing. As a result, the theoretical assumptions about the superior
performance of farmer-based organizations did not materialize. In fact,
they were not appropriately tested since there is little evidence of the
WUAs appreciating and carrying out their designated tasks.
6. Conclusions
Since the beginning of the 20th century, irrigation schemes have
mostly been in public hands with irrigation services provided by gov-
ernment agencies. The argument in favour of IMTs cite that state-run
schemes often performed weakly due to the lack of capacity, poor in-
centives and the limited ability to respond to demand changes. Further,
if governments did not have the resources to maintain and repair irri-
gation systems, water users will not be willing to pay, leading to un-
collected/ uncovered bills. In response, IMT was heralded as the answer
to these problems. WUAs have been formed in many countries as re-
cipients of irrigation management functions transferred to them from
the government. They were assumed to show more commitment,
ownership and efficiency in carrying out irrigation functions. However,
the evidence of IMT success is mixed and a plethora of success and
failure factors was put forward in academic literature. This paper
looked at the IMT reforms in the Gezira scheme as one of the largest
irrigation schemes in the world. We highlighted the importance of
considering longstanding development legacies, the perception of key
stakeholders such as farmers and the overall political-economic context
of the reforms.
The Gezira IMT case is documented as a retracted and failed reform
experience that evidently did not improve the scheme performance.
Our qualitative analysis provides nuanced narratives of this experience
suggesting a poor implementation and an unconducive environment for
the reforms. Farmers’ knowledge, capacities and involvement are key
for IMT reforms, but we found no evidence of these in our study. On the
one hand, it is not surprising that IMT reforms will fail if the target
group is not adequately educated and empowered. Instead of merely
pulling back from the scheme management, the state needs to provide
more support in terms of awareness raising, clear institutional rules and
an active role in rehabilitating infrastructure including roads and main
canals. The IMT reforms represented an abrupt transfer of authority in a
quite large scheme where farmers’ financial and organizational capa-
cities vary from one area to another. There is no evidence of a prior
experimentation with different participation approaches of farmers or a
gradual move to strengthen farming communities. Instead, we docu-
mented how distrust and the lack of reform ownership led to farmers
and experts perceiving the reforms as an effort to abandon the scheme.
On the other hand, we elaborated on the complex cultural, political,
developmental and performance-related legacies of the Gezira mega-
scheme. These legacies are reflected in the longstanding performance
deterioration, clashes of professions, instrumentalization of farmer
unions by the state and a politicization of the reforms. These factors
constituted an unfavourable environment for the reforms. The reforms
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have led to a state of institutional fuzziness and insecurity in which the
farmers did not carry out envisioned tasks. The awareness about the
reform benefits was low while farmers were not adequately in-
centivized to participate in the WUAs operations. Furthermore, the
ensuing conflicts over roles and responsibilities were not mitigated
through adequate responses, e.g. mediation or institutional peace-
making. Here, the government did not take an active role in managing
conflicts or delivering on some of its tasks such as canal rehabilitations.
At the same time, farmers had little trust in governmental institutions
and farmers’ unions suffered from a lack of representativeness and a
susceptibility for political interferences.
Addressing the schemes future needs to be reconstructed within a
larger context of breaking the low performance trap through a re-
valuation of good irrigation governance as a holistic concept. Such a
governance can involve, among others, property right based solutions,
ownerships, economic regulation and an honest dialogue about the
steps ahead. Successful IMT cases show that the capacity of the gov-
ernment to advocate for the reforms and lead in facilitating their im-
plementation is important. Building coalitions and alliances among key
stakeholder organizations in favour of IMTs or different forms of par-
ticipatory irrigation management can help promote the reforms. Above
all, a good irrigation governance prioritizes irrigation management as a
key function that can put the scheme on a high performance pathway.
The financial sustainability of the scheme needs to be improved through
a multi-level approach that can include improving fees collection, en-
couraging investments, public private partnerships and piloting tech-
nologies or exemplary farms. These ideas have been put forward by
stakeholders who stress that public policies have a major role to play in
promoting the scheme. At the same time, soft issues are equally im-
portant. They include empowering farmers and civil society to parti-
cipate in the schemes management, improving marketization of pro-
ducts and designing equitable, transparent and enforceable regulations.
Despite the modest success, many of the interviewed experts still regard
the idea of WUAs as conceptually interesting for the Gezira scheme
although they see the recovery of the scheme as a government’s re-
sponsibility that requires political prioritization. This is especially true
after the loss of much of the oil revenues in the wake of the separation
of South Sudan in 2011. Further, after the completion of the con-
struction of the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam, fewer sediments are
expected at the Gezira scheme. The Sudanese revolution which uttered
a new political era since 2019 has also raised hopes of economic im-
provements (e.g. lifting the sanctions) and a better governance of the
country’s resources, including Sudan’s huge potential for agricultural
development. These recent developments provide an opportunity to
improve the infrastructure and to explore new institutional arrange-
ments. There are many possible directions for future reforms that are
suggested by experts to be explored in future participatory and trans-
parent reform processes, e.g. restoring crop rotation, division of the
scheme into smaller units, piloting WUAs before upscaling, and in-
creasing capacities and trust of farmers.
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